

Message Text

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60

ACTION NEA-12

INFO OCT-01 EUR-25 IO-14 ISO-00 AF-10 CIAE-00 DODE-00

PM-07 H-03 INR-10 L-03 NSAE-00 NSC-07 PA-04 RSC-01

PRS-01 SP-03 SS-20 USIA-15 NIC-01 ACDA-19 SAJ-01

SAB-01 DRC-01 /159 W

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R 041422Z APR 74

FM AMEMBASSY CAIRO

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 6025

INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN

AMEMBASSY BEIRUT

USINT DAMASCUS

USMISSION GENEVA

AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

USMISSION USUN NEW YORK

C O N F I D E N T I A L CAIRO 1832

GENEVA FOR MEPC DEL - BEIRUT PASS BAGHDAD

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PFOR EG US

SUBJECT: SADAT'S APRIL 3 ADDRESS: SOVIET ASPECTS

1. DURING SPEECH DELIVERED AT ALEXANDRIA UNIVERSITY APRIL 3
SADAT GAVE CONSIDERABLE ATTENTION TO PAST SOVIET/EGYPTIAN
RELATIONSHIP. WHILE HIS REMARKS WRE NOT IN THEMSELVES DIRECTLY
CRITICAL OF PRESENT SOVIET POLICY, WE BELIEVE THEM TO BE
SUFFICIENTLY IMPORTANT TO WARRANT SPECIAL COMMENT. OTHER ASPECTS
OF SPEECH WILL BE COVERED SEPARATELY.

2. SADAT FIRST STATED THAT FOLLOWING THE FAILURE OF THE ROGERS
INITIATIVE, THE FAILURE OF THE SOVIET UNION TO DELIVER PROMISED
WEAPONRY HAD FORCED A POSTPONMENT OF WHAT WAS TO HAVE BEEN
AN EGYPTIAN ATTACK ON ISRAEL AT THE END OF 1971. SADAT SAID
THAT MAJOR WEAPONS DELIVERIES WERE TO OCCUR IN LAST THREE MONTHS
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OF 1971; BUT BY MID-DECEMBER NOTHING HAD ARRIVED, AND HE HAD

CABLED SOVIETS TO ASK WHY. HE WANTED TO TRAVEL TO USSR IN JANUARY TO SETTLE MATTER, BUT SOVIETS HAD DELAYED THIS VISIT UNTIL THE FOLLOWING MONTH: "I KNEW", SAID SADAT "THAT BY DELAYING THE DATE THEY MEANT TO CALM ME DOWN". HE SAID THAT NOTHING WAS ACCOMPLISHED DURING FEBRUARY VISIT, AND SO HE WENT AGAIN IN APRIL. SOVIETS TOLD HIM THAT THEY WERE OPPOSED TO MILITARY ACTION; BUT IT WAS AGREED THEN THAT MILITARY SHIPMENTS WOULD BEGIN AFTER MOSCOW SUMMIT OF MAY, WHEN IT HAD BEEN SHOWN THAT NOTHING NEW WOULD COME FROM US. AFTER THE SUMMIT, THIS WAS CLEARLY THE CASE, AND SOVIET ANALYSIS OF US INTENTIONS WAS SIMILAR TO EGYPTIAN: THE US WOULD DO NOTHING. NEVERTHELESS, SADAT SAID, SOVIETS MENTIONED NOTHING FURTHER ABOUT THEIR AGREEMENT TO SEND EGYPT ARMS. AT THIS POINT SADAT TOOK DECISION TO END MISSION OF SOVIET EXPERTS, WHO WOULD NOT HAVE ASSUMED COMBAT ROLES IN ANY CASE.

3. THIS WAS THE LOW POINT OF THE RELATIONSHIP. IN OCTOBER 1972, IT APPEARED TO IMPROVE WITH THE VISIT TO MOSCOW OF EGYPTIAN PRIME MINISTER SIDKY, BUT IMPROVEMENT DID NOT OCCUR IN FACT. IN DECEMBER, SADAT NOTED, THREE MONTHS REMAINED UNTIL TERMINATION OF EGYPTIAN/SOVIET AGREEMENT ON USE OF EGYPTIAN FACILITIES ON MEDITERRANEAN. SADAT HAD WAR MINISTER AHMAD ISMAIL INFORM SOVIETS THAT AGREEMENT WOULD BE RENEWED; AND FOLLOWING THIS AND VISIT TO MOSCOW BY AHMAD ISMAIL AND HAFEZ ISMAIL IN FEBRUARY 1973, AGREEMENT WAS REACHED ON NEW ARMS DELIVERIES. THE FIRST PART OF THESE BEGAN TO ARRIVE AFTER THE WAR MINISTER'S RETURN TO CAIRO, AND A DECISION WAS MADE TO PROCEED WITH PLANS FOR WAR. DESPITE THE ARMS DELIVERIES, THE SOVIETS MAINTAINED THEIR INSISTENCE ON A PEACEFUL RATHER THAN A MILITARY SOLUTION TO THE CONFLICT, AND ONCE AGAIN--DURING THE WASHINGTON SUMMIT--IT WAS EVIDENT THAT THE USSR AND THE US HAD AGREED THAT NOTHING SHOULD HAPPEN, AND THAT THE ME SHOULD BE KEPT IN THE DEEP FREEZE. HERE SADAT STATED THAT THE DECISION TO GO TO WAR WAS "ONE HUNDRED PERCENT EGYPTIAN" AND THAT NO OTHER POWER HAD BEEN INVOLVED IN IT--INDEED, IT WAS MADE AGAINST THE WILL OF THE SUPERPOWERS.

4. COMMENT: THE ABOVE LITANY OCCUPIED ALMOST FORTY-FIVE MINUTES OF A SPEECH WHICH OTHERWISE DEALT ALMOST EXCLUSIVELY WITH DOMESTIC AFFAIRS. WE BELIEVE IT IS IMPORTANT BECAUSE OF CONFIDENTIAL

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ITS SIMILARITY TO REMARKS SADAT MADE ABOUT THE US TOWARD THE END OF 1971. AT THAT TIME, THE ROGERS INITIATIVE APPEARED TO HAVE STALLED, AND SADAT'S ATTACKS ON THE US BECAME INCREASINGLY VOCAL AS HIS FRUSTRATION ROSE. HIS APRIL 3 STATEMENT FALLS SHORT OF DIRECT CRITICISM OF PRESENT SOVIET POLICY WHICH HE DOES NOT TOUCH UPON AT ALL; THEY IMPLY THAT THE PRESENT RELATIONSHIP IS NOT GOOD, AND IS LIKELY TO DECLINE FURTHER UNLESS SOVIET POLICY MORE CLOSELY MATCHES THAT OF EGYPT.

THIS WAS THE CASE WITH EGYPTIAN/US RELATIONS IN 1971, AND THE SIGNALS SADAT IS GIVING OUT ABOUT THE SOVIETS TODAY ARE EQUALLY STRONG.

5. WE WOULD ADD A PARTICULAR NOTE ABOUT THE SOVIET/EGYPTIAN TREATY OF FREINDSHIP AND COOPERATION WHICH, IT HAS BEEN RECENTLY RUMORED, MIGHT BE ABROGATED BY SADAT. THE TREATY IS NOW A VIRTUALLY DEFUNCT INSTRUMENT. DESIGNED ORIGINALLY BY THE SOVIETS TO ENSURE THAT THEY WERE CONSULTED BY THE EGYPTIANS ON POLICY DECISIONS OF MAJOR IMPORTANCE, IT HAS BEEN BREACHED SO OFTEN THAT IT HOLD NO AUTHORITY. IRONICALLY, IT REMAINS A USEFUL INSTRUMENT OF EGYPTIAN POLITICAL PRESSURE ON THE USSR IN THAT THE THREAT OF ITS ABROGATION (A) IS CREDIBLE AND (B) IF CARRIED OUT WOULD RESULT IN A MAJOR POLITICAL SETBACK FOR THE USSR NOT ONLY IN THE ARAB WORLD, BUT POSSIBLY ON A WIDER SCALE AS WELL. SUCH A TRUMP IS POTENT ONLY UNTIL IT IS PLAYED. SADAT IS NOT LIKELY TO DO SO UNTIL HE HAS NOTHING MORE TO GAIN BY HOLDING BACK, OR UNTIL HIS FRUSTRATION WITH THE SOVIETS HAS REACHED AN INTOLERABLE LEVEL. THIS HAS NOT YET OCCURED, ALTHOUGH THE SIGNS ARE POINTING INCREASINGLY IN THAT DIRECTION.EILTS

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